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The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the relationship banking in 
Japan in the 1990s.    We show the increasing dependence on bank borrowing in spite of 
the deregulation of bond market in the mid 1990s in terms of the debt composition, and 
we confirm the loan from main-bank also increases among the firms with higher bank 
borrowing.  Then, we examine the effects of these facts on borrowing firm behavior.  
By estimating the employment adjustment function, we present that main bank did not 
discipline effectively firms that were required the corporate restructuring, while it 
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1. Introduction. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the relationship banking in 
Japan in the 1990s, and answer the following questions:  Is the Japanese financial 
system still defined as the relationship-based financial system?    If the answer is yes in 
part, does relationship banking (or main bank system) play the welfare-enhancing role 
(the bright side) or rather plays a welfare-decreasing role (the dark side)?  If the dark 
side of the main bank system overwhelms its bright side, then why does it happen and 
what is the future of the main bank system? 
      To address these issue, we begin by summarizing the bank-firm relationship in the 
1990s Japan, showing that bank-firm relationship is not homogenous among Japanese 
firms.  Along with the well-known facts of the differences of bank dependence across 
industries, we highlight two untouched puzzling facts. First one is the increasing 
dependence on bank borrowing in spite of the deregulation of bond market in the mid 
1990s in terms of the debt composition.  By showing the estimation result on debt 
choice, we suggest that bank borrowing increasingly become important especially for 
firms with higher risk.    Second is the fact that the degree of concentration of loan from 
main-bank increases among the firm with higher bank borrowing.  It implies that the 
bank-firm relationship has been getting heterogeneous in the 1990s, and there are a 
certain number of firms that depend on main bank for their important financial 
resources.  On the cause of this increasing commitment, we raise two possible 
interpretations: either the banks pick a winner and take an initiative to promote 
necessary corporate restructuring, or the banks roll over their loans and adopt 
evergreen polices, delaying corporate restructuring of borrowers.     
Since banks rather than borrowers are overwhelmed by non-performing loan 
problem in the 1990s, understanding the impact of the banking crisis on borrowers is 
naturally essential for understanding the current bank-firm relationship.   Introducing 
the growing literature on this topic such as Brewer et al. (2003) and Miyajima and Yafeh 
(2003) that focus on the market response of borrowers to the banking crisis, we show 
that the banking crisis does matter, but does not affect Japanese firms equally.  The 
banking crisis is especially harmful not only for firms with high leverage and high bank   2
dependence, but also for firms with low profitability in low-tech industries.  These 
results imply that the market pushed the “creative destruction,” and thus the banking 
crisis is not necessarily welfare decreasing.  However, the “creative destruction” 
interpretation derived from the market model shows the market response of firms to the 
banking crisis, and it is still unclear whether the banking crisis has had a substantial 
effect on borrowing firm’s behavior.     
Then, we examine whether firms with positive NPV suffer from the credit crunch 
or not in the 1990s?  By investigating the relationship between internal fund and 
investment, we show that there is little evidence that firms with high growth 
opportunities are seriously faced with credit crunch in general.     
Furthermore, we examine whether main bank encourage corporate restructuring, 
while it avoid discouraging profitable projects that are slow to pay off?  By estimating 
the employment adjustment function, we show that the increasing degree of 
concentration of loan from main bank is associated with the delay of employment 
reduction in firms facing serious necessity of corporate restructuring, and with high 
employment reduction in firms that are keeping their earnings relatively high.  Thus, 
main bank in the 1990s played the reverse role from the one it is supposed: i.e. main 
bank did not discipline effectively the firms that are really required corporate 
restructuring, while it encouraged the restructuring of the firm with relatively better 
performance. 
This chapter is organized as follows.    The next section summarizes the changes of 
the debt composition for Japanese firms in the 1990s.    Section three explores the effect 
of the banking crisis on Japanese firms.  After discussing the theoretical framework of 
corporate governance by main bank in section four, we examine the problem of credit 
crunch in section five.  Section six examines the role of main bank in corporate 
restructuring in firms with decreasing profits.  The last section provides some 
conclusions. 
 
２  Puzzling Features in Corporate Finance 
2-1 Changes in corporate finance   3
Against a drastic changes in macroeconomic circumstances and deregulation, to 
what extent did corporate finance among Japanese listed firms shift away from the 
former bank-based pattern in the 1990s?  Let us begin to summarize the corporate 
finance practices of non-financial listed firms in the First Section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. 
After the vigorous use of equity related financing during the late 1980s, the capital 
structure of Japanese firms underwent drastic change.  Figure 1 summarizes the time 
series change of the financial status among listed firms from 1980 to 2002.1   It is clear 
that the weight of the firms in category E2, which depends only on bond issuance, 
increased from almost zero (0.2%) in 1980 to 7.8% in 1990, while the firms in category N, 
which exclusively depends on bank borrowing, decreased from 58% in 1980 to 28% in 
1991.    
The diversity of the capital composition across Japanese firms has increased during 
the 1990s.  Firms in category E1, which do not depend on leverage at all, increased 
from 4.2 % in 1990 to 11.7% in 2000, while the firms in category N, which exclusively 
depend on bank borrowing, increased from 29.4 % in 1991 to 46.9% in 2000.  Firms 
which depend on bond issuance and firms using a mixture of bond issuance and bank 
borrowing constantly decreased. 
== Figure  1 is about here == 
Detailed information on capital composition is presented in Table 1.  First, we see 
that the ratio of debt (the sum of bond and borrowing) to asset in 1990 decreased 4.5% 
points from 1986 with low standard deviation, while the ratio of borrowing to debt 
decreased from 69.5% in 1986 to 54.5% in 1990.     
This decreasing bank dependence was the result of rational choices by Japanese 
firms under deregulation.  According to Hoshi et al (1993) and Miyajima and Arikawa 
(2000), firms with higher profitability increasingly depended on bonds for their financial 
resources, while firms with lower profitability continued to depend on bank borrowing 
during the 1980s.  On the other hand, facing the large shift from borrowing to bonds, 
banks increased land-collateral loans to small and medium-sized firms in 
                                                   
1  Aoki et al (1994) shows similar figure from 1966 to 1992.   4
non-manufacturing sectors.  Then, it was inevitable that the loan portfolio of banks 
deteriorated at the end of the bubble period in the sense that firms with low profitability 
remained clients of the banks, and land-collateral loans to non-manufacturing sectors 
i n c r e a s e d .     
   The increasing diversity in the capital composition among firms is also clear from 
Table 1.  Even though the debt-asset ratio of firms on average is almost constant, its 
standard deviation has increased during the past decade, especially since 1997.  The 
difference in bank dependence across industries is also enlarged in the 1990s.  While 
bank dependence on average among firms in manufacturing sectors has decreased since 
1993, the firm in non-manufacturing sectors, particularly construction, real estate and 
retail sector, increased its bank borrowings.  Stressing that the declining profitability 
of these sectors has been obvious since 1993, Peek and Rosengren (2003) and others 
suggested that there have been serious credit misallocations since the mid 1990s. 
Another feature of corporate finance in the 1990s is the changes in debt 
composition.  It is remarkable that after 1991, the ratio of borrowing to total debt 
consistently increased during the 1990s, especially from 1997 to 1999.  This ratio in 
2000 is 70.7%, which is higher than that of 1986, when the bond issuance was still 
heavily regulated.  Why did the borrowing substitute for bond issuance in this period?  
Since the demand for new money stagnated during the 1990s, it is highly plausible that 
bonds issued in the late 1980s were amortized and replaced by bank borrowing.  Then 
what type of firms continued to raise their funds through bond issuance, and what kind 
of firms switched their financial resources from corporate bonds to bank borrowing 
again?   
== Table1 is about here == 
 
2-2    Debt choice after complete deregulation 
One approach for explaining the determinants of debt choice between bonds and 
borrowing is to stress the comparative advantage of a bank as a monitor.  By 
emphasizing the ability of banks to mitigate the costs of asymmetric information, 
Diamond (1991) construct a model that shows firms with less established reputations   5
tend to borrow from banks, while firms that are more successful tend to issue bonds.2   
Thakor and Wilson (1995) discuss another benefit of bank borrowing.  Because of its 
concentrated ownership, the banking sector decides efficiently whether to liquidate or 
bail out a firm in financial distress by renegotiating the terms of the debt contract with 
borrowers.  Since the ownership of public bonds is dispersed among bondholders, they 
cannot rescue financially distressed firms as efficiently as banks do.  Furthermore, as 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) shows, a bank devotes more resources to renegotiate 
with its client in financial distress than do bond holders because banks are concerned 
with their long-term reputation.     
Although bank borrowing has benefits for borrowers, there exist offsetting costs 
that prevent firms from borrowing exclusively from banks.  One approach for 
explaining the cost of bank borrowing suggested by Sharpe (1990) and Rajan(1992) is 
based on the observation that while a bank can reduce agency problems, the 
firm-specific information acquired by a bank may create a hold-up problem.   
Rajan(1992), for example, argues that the informational rents extracted by banks ex 
post distort the firm’s investment by reducing the entrepreneur’s returns from 
successful projects.3       
Following this theoretical literature, we derive the hypothesis that a firm does not 
use bank borrowing when default risk is low enough or future profit is high enough.  
Thus, the first point to be empirically tested is the validity of this hypothesis.    We focus 
on the debt choice after 1996, when regulations for bond issuance were completely lifted, 
and the reverse shift from bonds to borrowing became clear.4  We use listed firms on 
the TSE First Section from 1996 to 2000 as the sample.  We exclude firms in finance 
and public utilities from our sample.  The average total asset for our sample firms in 
2000 is 24.1 billion dollars and the average number of employees is about 2.800, 
                                                   
2 Following this idea, Petersen and Rajan (1994) find empirical evidence that close 
relationship with banks have made it possible for small U.S. firms to borrow at lower costs. 
3   Houston and James (1996) find that U.S. large firms with substantial growth 
opportunities tend to limit the use of bank debt because of the serious hold-up problem. 
4 Miyajima and Arikawa (2000) present the empirical evidence of what determines the 
Japanese firm’s choice between unsecured bond and bank-borrowing in the 1980s and the 
early 1990s. They test the hypotheses that the firm does not use bank borrowing with an 
implicit rescue-insurance when the default risk is low or future profitability is high enough.   6
whereas the median of total assets for firms listed on TSE First Section is 9 billion 
dollars and the median number of employees is 2,000.  Thus, our sample includes not 
only large firms but also relatively middle-size firms.     
To test our hypothesis, we regress the debt structure on some explanatory 
variables at the previous year.  The 2-Limit Tobit model is selected as the estimation 
method, since dependent variables are truncated at both zero and one.  We use the 
ratio of bank borrowing to total debt as a dependent variable.  For an explanatory 
variable, debt divided by total assets is used as the proxy of likelihood of financial 
distress.5  We predict that high values of this variable would encourage a firm to use 
bank borrowing, while low leveraged firm tend to issue bonds more in order to avoid 
strict monitoring by banks.    The volatility of monthly stock returns over the last three 
years is also included as a proxy of risk.  We adopt Tobin’s q to capture the firm’s 
growth opportunity in the same way as Hoshi et al.(1993).6  Following Wo, Sercu, and 
Yao (2002), we also introduce q2 in the regression to capture the possibility that firms 
with high growth opportunities but facing large uncertainty demand bank borrowing.  
In addition, we add the logarithm of assets to the explanatory variables to control for 
t he ef f ec t  of  f ir m  siz e o n de bt  c ho ic e.   Last ly ,  y ear  d um m y  v ar iab le i s  inc l u de d f or  
controlling macroeconomic factors and other exogenous factors such as the banking 
crisis associated with the downgrading of government bonds and so on.   
The estimation results are shown in Table 2.  The coefficient of year dummy in 
1997 is only significant, and its magnitude is huge.  The ratio of bank borrowing to 
total debt in 1997 is roughly five to seven percent higher than other years, other 
variables being equal.  Somehow ironically, the banking crisis brought about 
increasing bank dependence.  The coefficient of log of assets as a proxy for firm size is 
significantly negative.    This means that larger firms can issue bonds more easily using 
their reputation.  Firms’ choice of bank borrowing is significantly and positively 
correlated with debt-asset ratio.  A higher possibility of financial distress implies 
                                                   
5  Here, we use the market value of land and holding securities, but other tangible assets are 
accounted by book value. 
6  Anderson and Makhija (1999) adopt growth opportunities for investigating the 
determinant of debt choice.   7
larger demand for bank borrowing.  Similarly, the coefficient of volatility is 
significantly positive.     
On the other hand, the relation between the ratio of bank borrowing to total debt 
and q is significantly negative.  The firm with better prospects tends to move away 
from bank borrowing.  The coefficient of q2 is significantly positive, and this result is 
consistent with the result of Wo, Sercu and Yao (2002).  The threshold of q is around 
1.9, although the value of the threshold slightly varies by the specification.  Roughly 
speaking, approximately 5 to 10 % of firms out of the entire sample locate to the right 
hand side of this threshold.     
 
== Table 2 is about here == 
 
The estimation result that firms with high growth opportunities and low risk depend 
on the bond issuance would be consistent with theoretical predictions, and could explain 
the drastic decrease of bond issuance in the 1990s.  While firms that are relatively 
large, with low default risk and high growth opportunities, continue to depend on 
capital market, other firms even in the First Section of TSE depend on bank borrowing 
due to decreasing profitability and increasing default risk.  Consequently, the 
importance of bank borrowing has been revived again in the 1990s.   Second, the 
positive sign of q2 suggests that bank borrowing is important for firms with quite high 
growth opportunities, although this type of firm is relatively limited.  They tend to be 
relatively young, and thus have less reputation in the capital market.7  It implies that 
there are a certain number of firms with high growth opportunities that depend on bank 
borrowings even in the 1990s, and banking sector kept lending to these firms even 
during the banking crisis.   
     
2-3    Increasing main bank loan concentration 
Along with increasing dependence on bank borrowing, another remarkable feature 
                                                   
7  The average year of incorporation in this type of firms is 1948, which is 4 years younger than the 
rest of firms.    8
of corporate finance of Japanese firms in the 1990s is the increasing degree of 
concentration of loan from main bank.  Is this the result of the strengthening 
bank-firm relationship among Japanese firm?  We investigate this problem here.   
Fir st, we ident ify main bank s of each firm as the largest lender among banks.  
Since main bank ties are characterized as long-term and stable, we check whether the 
main bank of each firm is same as five years ago or not.    If a firm has a main bank that 
has not changed for five years, then we call it a firm with stable main bank ties.  This 
definition roughly identifies about three-quarters of all firms as having a main bank. 
== Table 3 is about here === 
According to Table 3, as long as we see the number of firms with main banks, the 
stable relationship between bank and firms was sustained until 1997 and somehow 
dissolved afterward when the banking crisis became serious.  Out of 82 cases of the 
number of firms with main banks decrease between 1998 and 1999, 14 cases are due to 
the delisting of firms, 26 cases are the result of three banks failures, and the remaining 
42 cases show main bank changes.  In this regard, the banking crisis may mark the 
beginning of the dissolution of the stable relationship between bank and firms.   
Right side of Table 3 presents the overall change of main bank ties in the 1990s.  
First, dispatching bank members to client firms seems to be decreasing.  This is 
consistent with the finding that bank intervention became less systematic in the 1990s 
than before (Hirota and Miyajima 2000).  Second, the percentage share held by the 
main bank is stable, as long as its median and third quartile is concerned (not reported).   
This result is consistent with the fact that a bank tends to keep the equity holdings of 
firms when it is their main bank (see chapter 3).  Third, most remarkably, the ratio of 
borrowing from main bank to assets, MBR, consistently increases with escalating 
standard deviation since 1991, especially after 1997, of financial crisis.  Decomposing 
this ratio into the ratio of borrowing over asset and the ratio of borrowing from main 
bank over total borrowing, we find that not only the ratio of borrowing over asset, but 
also the ratio of borrowing from main bank over total borrowing increased constantly. 
Since non-performing loan problem is quite serious in construction, real estate, 
and retail sector, we compare the main bank relationship in these three sectors with   9
that of relatively better performing sectors, transportation, electrical and industrial 
machinery.  We find that the ratio of borrowing from main bank to assets increases in 
both sectors.  However, in the three sectors with poor performance, we can find the 
higher percentage of firms that have close main banks ties shows higher ratio of 
borrowing from main bank to assets with lower standard deviation, and larger amount 
of borrowing compared to the three machinery industries.  In fact, bank dependence 
and main bank commitment increased during 1990s in these threes sectors with poor 
performance. 
Then, how can we interpret this increasing main bank loan concentration?  
According to the estimation results of the determinants of main bank loan concentration 
using the same model as the one for debt choice, we find that the determinants of main 
bank loan concentration are almost as same as those for debt choice (not reported).  
The ratio of borrowing from main bank to assets is negatively sensitive to tobin’s q, and 
positively associated with the debt-asset ratio and volatility of monthly stock returns 
over the last three years. 
There are two possible interpretation for these results.  First, since the 
concentrated debt holding by main bank helps mitigate free riding behavior of debt 
holder when firms are in distress (Bulow and Shaven 1978, Hall and Weinstein 2000), 
the increase of the ratio of borrowing from main bank to assets could be the result that 
main bank coordinated the other lenders, and took the initiative in corporate 
restructuring of borrowers.  Second, the increasing commitment to the borrower by 
main bank may also be possible if a bank continued to roll over loans to less profitable 
borrowers at the expense of their loan portfolio diversification in the hope of recovering 
its loan or to dress up its own balance sheet, while the arms-length lender does not lend 
to a borrower who is on the verge of bankruptcy.   
Put differently, the increasing main bank lending concentration could be 
interpreted as either 1) the bank’s policy of picking winners and taking the initiative in 
corporate restructuring, or 2) the rolling over their loans to less profitable firms or 
adopting ‘evergreen polices’ based on their perverse incentives, thus resulting in credit 
misallocation and the delay of corporate restructuring of borrowers.  Then, we ask   10
later which the major case is.       
 
3.    The Impact of Banking Crisis on Bank-Firm Relationship     
The most important factor for the relationship banking in the 1990s in Japan is 
the banking crisis.8    Banks that were formerly expected to rescue borrowers in the mid 
financial distress were now mired in trouble.    What was the effect of this banking crisis 
on the bank-firm relationship?     
The poor performance of the banking sector has become a serious problem since 
1995 when the Jusen problem (Housing loan company’s insolvency problem) emerged.  
As a result, a “Japan premium” on the costs of Japanese banks firstly appeared in the 
Euro market (Ito and Harada 2000).    Bank stock prices declined relative to other stock 
prices starting around the end of 1995.  Price /Book Value ratio of major banks and 
local banks on average decreased from 4.04 in the end of 1990 to 2.48 in the end of 1996.   
The credit rating of major banks were AA or higher in the early1990s. However, 
following the Jusen crisis and some bank bailouts, many banks were downgraded to A or 
lower.  It was in November 1997 when financial crisis overwhelmed the Japanese 
financial system.  On November 3, Sanyo Securities defaulted in the inter-bank loan 
market, which was followed by the failure of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi 
Securities, one of the four large securities houses. Subsequently, two long-term loan 
banks, Long Term Credit Bank and Nihon Credit Bank that almost became insolvent 
were nationalized in 1998.  During this banking crisis, the Japan premium increased, 
and average Price /Book Value ratio of banks declined further to 1.19 at the end of 1998.   
Downgrading of banks also continued, and the credit rationing of almost all banks were 
BBB or lower at the end of 1998. 9  
There is a growing number of literature that focuses on the effect of the banking 
crisis on client firms.  Yamori and Murakami (1998) and Brewer et al. (2003) examine 
the impact of the announcement of Japanese bank distress on the stock prices of 
                                                   
8  For the detail story of banking crisis and its over all impact, see Hoshi and Kashyap (2001), 
Nakaso (2001),Peek and Rosengren (2001). 
9  For downgrading of majar banks, see detail Miyajima and Yafeh (2003), Appendix A.     11
non-financial institutions, and highlight the negative response of their stock prices.  
Extending this literature, Miyajima and Yafeh (2003) investigates the effect of the 
banking crisis on Japanese firms using about 800 listed firms on the First Section of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange.    Their main question is, who has the most to lose?     
The empirical analysis is based on the standard event study method; 
measurement of abnormal stock returns for the sample firms around the date of an 
event related to the banking crisis.  As in all event studies, they begin by estimating 
the “market model.”10  Because it is sometimes hard to verify the date on which news 
might have affected the market, and because some events evolved over several trading 
days, the analysis focuses on cumulative abnormal returns between dates –5 and +5 for 
each event. 
Considering existing intensive studies of the effect of bank failure on client firms, 
they pick up events such as bank downgrading, government action and others from 
1995 to 2000.    Estimated simple equation is: 
 
) , , ,   ,   , ( MBR RD BOND DAR q SIZE f CAR =      
 
Where, CAR is cumulative abnormal returns,  SIZE, the logarithm of firms assets, 
DAR is the leverage calculated by the debt over total assets, BOND is the variable that 
expresses the bond rating of firm i.  q is Tobin’s q, which is the proxy of firms’ quality.  
RD is a dummy variable that is given one if a firm belongs to high R&D industries, 
following Carlin and Mayer (2003), which predicts that R&D activity rarely relies on 
bank finance.    MBR is the ratio of borrowing from main banks to total assets. 
The essence of their empirical result is as follows.  First, they show that 
government injections of capital to the banking sector have been important.  In 
particular, these measures have constituted “good news” for the typical bank dependent 
                                                   
10  For each firm, stock returns are regressed on (a constant and) the market returns (Tokyo 
Stock Exchange Price Index, the TOPIX index), using 40 daily observations between dates 
–60 and –20 (where date zero is the date of the event in question). The estimated parameters 
of the regression are then used to generate the predicted return for each firm around the 
event date. Finally, abnormal returns are defined as the actual stock returns in excess of the 
model’s prediction.   12
company: operating in a low-tech sector (low R&D expenditure), with limited access to 
bond markets and a high degree of leverage.   
Similarly, the main beneficiaries of improving banking supervision were also small 
firms, which are less profitable, in low-tech sectors, with limited access to bond 
financing (low bond rating) and a high degree of leverage.  They conclude that 
government actions matter, and firms which can be characterized as bank-dependent 
respond more to such government actions.       
Furthermore, they show that downgrading announcements of banks’ credit 
ratings appear to have been particularly harmful to highly leveraged companies, where 
the coefficient is statistically significant with substantial magnitude.11  Also sensitive to 
downgrading are firms in low R&D industries with low credit ratings, although its effect 
is smaller than that of leverage.  In addition, there is the evidence that large and 
profitable firms seem to be suffered less from downgrading of their banks.  Lastly, the 
stock price of firms with higher dependence on bank borrowing as well as main bank 
loans negatively respond more to downgrading and positively more to government 
action.  
In sum, the result that the negative stock price response of firms with high leverage 
and high main bank dependence to the troubles of main bank such as bankruptcy and 
downgrading and the positive response to government action suggest that the bank-firm 
relationship does matter.    More importantly, however, the banking crisis does not affect 
client firms equally.  The banking crisis is especially harmful for low tech, less 
profitable firms with difficulty accessing the capital market.    The banking crisis might 
cause the “creative destruction”.  In other words, what occurred during the banking 
crisis is a slow “cleansing process”.   
The above researches examined the market response of client firms to the banking 
crisis, but it is still unclear whether the banking crisis had a substantial effect on 
borrowing firm behavior.    Then, we examine this problem in the following sections. 
 
                                                   
11  For example, firms with leverage two standard deviations above the mean experienced 7% lower 
CAR.     13
4    Two faces of main bank relationship in corporate governance 
We first discuss the theoretical framework of corporate governance by main bank.  
Aoki (2001) clarifies a bailout mechanism by main bank as relational-contingent 
governance.  In the usual debt contract, as Aghion and Bolton (1992) explain, the 
control right shifts from the insider to the outsider (debt-holder) at the point where the 
output level does not exceed interest payments in value.  However, as Aoki explains, 
when main bank in Japan monitors a borrower, the output level determining to whom 
control rights belong can be divided into three  regions: the borrower-control region, 
the bank-control region, and the critical bankruptcy region.  Consequently, what is 
unique in this relational-contingent governance is the existence of an output level 
where the relationship bank bail out a borrower in mid financial distress because the 
rents that banks can extract from borrowers exceed the total costs of rescuing.  
Therefore, the debt supplied by a main bank is de facto debt with implicit 
rescue-insurance, and a manager comes to expect a bailing out by a relationship bank in 
cases of financial distress. 
When this relational-contingent governance works well, the effort level of 
managers increases because they have strong incentives to entrench themselves against 
bank intervention.  On the other hand, an appropriate bail out of client firms in 
financial distress by additional money lending and interest reductions would be helpful 
to avoid the inefficiencies of discouraging profitable projects that are slow to pay off 
during periods of financial distress.12   
However, Aoki also argues that there exist double-edged commitment problems 
under the incomplete contract environment in the relational-contingent governance. 
One is the shot-termism or credit crunch problem.    That is, main bank terminate firms 
to be bailed out socially if main bank cannot get enough rent from bailing out.    Another 
is the failure of commitment of termination of loans to client firms when it falls in the 
bankruptcy region because of the too high rent for main bank, or soft budget problem 
(Dewatripont and Maskin,1995).  If the threat of termination were not credible, it 
                                                   
12 However, Hanazaki and Horiuchi(2000) denied the role of main bank in corporate 
governance, insisting that the efficiency of firms were basically kept by market competition 
even in the high growth era.   14
would be highly plausible that borrowers adopt moral hazard behavior expecting the 
rescue by main bank.  Suppose that a bank balance sheet is deteriorating, and the 
bank highly committed to an unprofitable borrower; it may decide to supply the 
additional lending to a borrower not based upon the evaluation of its future 
reconstruction, but for dressing up non-performing loan to keep the capital required by 
the Basel Accord.  This perverse incentive of banks would also be stronger if a bank 
were the main bank of a client firms, because loans from the main bank are supposedly 
subordinated to other loans and the huge loan amount is obviously critical in a bank’s 
balance  sheet.   
    Following these theoretical hypothesis, we investigate the two empirical problems. 
1. If most firms that are sensitive to the banking crisis are in bad performance, 
reducing bank lending to them is not detrimental to Japanese economy.   However, if it 
were not the case, the welfare implication is quite serious.  Then the question is 
whether firms with positive NPV were free from the credit crunch or not. 
2. If the market response encourages “creative destruction”, then did high bank 
dependence actually drive corporate restructuring, and the main bank take an initiative 
in that process?    Or, as recent literature has pointed out, did the high bank dependence 
undermines incentives for firms to take necessary corporate restructuring measures?     
 
      
5    Credit crunch and investment 
A large volume of literature treats from various perspectives about the credit 
crunch in the 1990s Japan.  The first approach is to focus on the supply side of loans, 
and examine whether the non-performing loan problem or risk-based capital ratios 
really brought about the contraction of bank lending or not.  For instance, Itoh and 
Sasaki (2002) show that banks with lower capital ratios tended to issue more 
subordinated debt and to reduce lending.  Honda (2002) and Montgomery (2004) 
examine the differential effects of the Basel Accords on domestic and international 
banks, and show that international banks with relatively low capital ratios tended to 
contract their overall assets and shift their asset portfolio out of loans and into risk-less   15
assets such as government bonds.  However, Woo (1999) points out the evidence that 
the contraction of lending is rather limited, and found only for 1997, immediately after 
many large banks went bankrupt. 
The second approach is to look at the demand side of loans by addressing whether 
the credit crunch affects the real economy or not.  Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999) 
estimate investment functions for large and small firms using the Bank of Japan 
Diffusion Indices (DIs) of real profitability and bank’s willingness to lend as the 
explanatory variables.  Employing the latter variables as an indicator of possible 
financing constraints, they find that the financing constraints significantly affect 
investments of small firms, but not that of large firms.  Thus, they conclude that the 
credit crunch does not explain the long stagnation of investment throughout the 1990s, 
but it had a negative impact on investment during 1997-1998. 
For investigating further the credit crunch problem in the 1990s, we estimate the 
investment function with the cash flow developed by Fazzari et al. (1988).  W e use 
manufacturing firms listed on the TSE First Section from 1993 to 2000 as the sample.  
The estimation formula is as follows.     
 
) , ,   ,   ( 1 YD DAR CF q f I t t 1 - t t − =  
 
Here, I is investment level, which is calculated as depreciation plus the difference of 
fixed assets from period t-1 to period t divided by fixed assets.  q is Tobin’s q.  CF is 
cash flow calculated as the depreciation plus after-tax profit minus dividend and bonus 
paid to directors divided by total assets.    DAR is the leverage, or firms’ debt (borrowing 
plus bonds) to their current assets.  CF is introduced to capture the cash flow 
constraint.    For controlling the effect of parent companies on the investment of related 
firms, we introduce the SUB dummy, if more than 15 % of firm’s issued stock is held by 
other single non-financial institutions.   
Using this model, we perform the credit crunch test.  If firms with positive NPV 
face liquidity constraint, their investment is seriously constrained by their internal 
funds.  In order to test this hypothesis, we divide sample firms into three sub-groups   16
based on three years’ average of a firm’s Tobin’s q prior to selected firm year.    Firms are 
defined as firms with high growth opportunities (hereafter HQ firms), if their Tobin’s q 
is higher than the third quartile of the whole sample, while firms are defined as firms 
with low growth opportunities (hereafter LQ firms), if their Tobin’s q is lower than the 
first quartile of LQ.  Then, we introduce the interaction term between HQ and LQ 
dummy and CF in regression.  The estimation results of manufacturing firms from 
1993-2000 are reported in Table 4.   
 
===Table 4 about here=== 
 
The coefficient of CF is significantly positive in column 1.  When we see the 
interaction term of CF with HQ and LQ dummy (column 4 and column 5), there is no 
evidence that investment of HQ firms is more sensitive to their cash flow than that of 
LQ firms.  Rather, the sensitivity of investment in LQ firms is much higher than that 
of high growth opportunities.  These results imply that firms with low growth 
opportunities presumably face the free cash flow problems in the sense of Jensen (1986), 
whereas firms with high growth opportunities could invest regardless of their cash flow, 
and consequently they are free from the constraint of internal funds.  This is also 
consistent with the result of Miyajima, Arikawa and Kato (2002), which shows that 
physical investment of firms with growth opportunities were relatively free from 
financial constraints, being different from R&D investment.     
It is true that the investment in HQ firms is constrained by their internal funds if 
we limit sample firms to the shorter sub- period (1993-95, 1995-97, and 1997-00).  The 
sub-period that we find the HQ firm is financially constrained is only from 1997 to 2000, 
which is the period of the banking crisis.13  This result is consistent with the result of 
the other literatures.  Thus, like Hoshi and Kasyap(2004), we can conclude that at 
least the firms listed on TSE do not faced the serious credit crunch in general. 
                                                   
13  Ogawa (2003) present that smaller firms faced the debt overhang problem in the 1990s.  
Since non-listed firms with high growth opportunities have no financial options except bank 
borrowing, they may face such problems more seriously, given less developed capital market.    17
 
6. Corporate Restructuring 
There are several approaches to examine the work of relational contingent 
governance in Japanese firms in terms of the threat of termination to the borrowing 
firm.  The first approach is to focus on the relation between profitability of the 
borrowing firms and the loan increase, and suggested the existence of soft budget 
problem or credit misallocation by banks.  For example, Peek and Rosengren (2003) 
find that bank increased its credit to poor performing firms between 1993 and 1999, and 
main banks were more likely to lend to these firms than other banks.  Furthermore, 
they show that this credit misallocation is found more when the bank’s balance sheet is 
weak.   
Second approach is to examine corporate restructuring when a firm faces serious 
earnings decline.  Hoshi et al. (1990) as a pioneer work in this field document that 
firms with close main bank ties maintain investment levels compared to independent 
firms even when these firms faced financial distress in the structural adjustment period 
(1978-1982).  On the other hand, Kang and Shivdasani (1997) show that firms with 
closer main bank ties reduced their assets even more during the business upturn of the 
late 1980s. Although the role of main banks that they reported seems to be completely 
opposite, they commonly stress its bright side based on private information: avoiding 
inefficient early liquidation (Hoshi et al. 1990) and exerting appropriate discipline on 
client firms (Kang and Shivdasani 1997). 
However, since both works did not go beyond the late 1980s, it is still an open 
question whether main bank system plays such a significant role even in the late 1990s.   
To answer this question, we estimate the employment adjustment function and 
investigate whether firms with close main bank ties implement the necessary corporate 
restructuring when they face serious performance decline or not.   In the estimation 
equation, dependent variable is the percentage change of employment.  For 
independent variable, we use the followings;  lag of  the percentage change of 
employment, change of real sales growth rate to control the effect of firm performance.  
Further, for testing the effect of the bank-firm relationship on corporate restructuring,   18
we introduce the ratio of debt to asset, the ratio of the bank borrowing to debt, and the 
ratio of borrowing from main bank to asset.     
Furthermore, following Kang and Shivdasani (1997), we produce the dummy 
variable,  NAD, as a proxy of the necessity of corporate restructuring. This dummy 
variable equals one if the three-year average of operational profit from 1993-95 of 
sample firms is 50% lower than those of 1988-90, and otherwise it is zero.  We say a 
firm faces the necessity of restructuring if this dummy variable equal one.    We call the 
firm with this dummy variable equal one as NAD  firm.   
Then, we test whether the (main) bank urges these firms to take the necessary 
restructuring measures or just helps them to put off solving the problem.  Table 5 
present the distribution and descriptive statistics of sample firms.  Being different 
from Kang and Shivdasani (1997) that address the business upturns (the late 1980s), 
the number of firms that faces the significant decline of operational profit is larger in 
the late 1990s.  Roughly speaking, two thirds of sample firms are identified as the 
firms that are necessary to reconstruct their business.  As expected, there are large 
numbers of firms that suffer a significant decrease in performance in construction and 
retail industries.  However, it should be noticed that textile, iron and steel, and even 
the machine sector (electrical and transportation) include large numbers of firms with 
performance decline.    In Panel 2, we can find that the ratio of employment reduction is 
much larger for NAD firm, and leverage, bank dependence and main bank loan 
concentration is also much higher in  the  NAD firms.  Estimation results are 
summarized in Table 6.  
=== Table 5 /6 about here=== 
The coefficient of the change of real sale growth is positive and highly significant for all 
estimations.  One percent decrease of this variable is associated with approximately 
0.13-0.2% of employee reduction.  On the other hand, the coefficient of debt-asset ratio 
is negative and significant in column 1.    The leverage affect on reducing employment in 
general.  However, there is no difference between firms with restructuring necessity 
and other firms in this effect, as long as the interaction term between the debt-asset   19
ratio and NAD in column 2 applies.14  The coefficient of the ratio of bank borrowing to 
debt is significantly negative in general (column 3), but no difference between NAD 
firms and others firms was found in column 4.  Thus, we cannot figure out whether 
high leverage and high bank dependence promote the “creative destruction” on client 
firms. 
Once we add the ratio of borrowing from main bank over asset to the regression, 
the coefficient of interaction term between the ratio of the bank borrowing over debt and 
NAD is significantly negative and the coefficient of the ratio of borrowing from main 
bank over asset and NAD is positive in column 6.   This result contrasts with column 5 
where the coefficient of the ratio of borrowing from main bank over asset is not 
significant.  That is, among firms facing the serious necessity of corporate 
restructuring, bank dependence was associated with rapid employment adjustment, 
while the high concentration of the borrowing from main bank was associated with slow 
employment adjustment.     
This contrasting result of bank dependence and main bank loan concentration is 
also clear in column 7 and 8, where we divide sample firms into the firm with the 
necessity of restructuring and other firms, and estimated the same model separately.  
The coefficient of the ratio of bank borrowing to debt is significantly negative and that of 
the ratio of borrowing from main bank to asset is positive in NAD firms.     
In order to distinguish the effect of the loan from main bank and other debt more 
clearly, we introduce the ratio of non-main bank debt to total borrowing.  Here 
non-main bank debt includes borrowing from banks except main bank and bonds, and 
w e  c o u l d  r e g a r d  t h i s  a s  t h e  a r m ’ s  l e n g t h  d e b t .   I n  c o l u m n  9 ,  w e  f i n d  t h e  r a t i o  o f  
non-main bank debt to total borrowing is significantly negative, which suggests that 
firms are more likely to downsize their employment when they depend for their 
financial resources more on the non-main bank borrowing, or arm’s length debt.  
Second, the interaction term between the ratio of borrowing from main bank to asset 
and NAD dummy is significantly positive, while the ratio of borrowing from main bank 
                                                   
14  This result is supported by the comparison of the DAR of NAD firms with that of other 
firms in column 7 and 8.   20
to asset itself is negative.15  This result suggests that the high main bank loan 
concentration in non-NAD firms associated with a relatively lower growth rate of 
employment, while that of NAD firms associated with a relatively higher growth rate of 
employment. 
  Many literatures like Peek and Rosengren (2003) insist that Japanese banks tend 
to bailout almost bankrupt firms through ever-greening old loans and keep unprofitable 
firms.  Caballero et al.(2004) called these artificially survived firms  “zombies”.  Our 
estimation result suggest that the evergreen policy taken by banks and resulting 
“zombies” might not be so prevalent across Japanese firms, because the high bank 
dependence tends to reduce the growth rate of employment in non-NAD firms.  The 
high bank dependent firms, whose stock prices are sensitive to the troubles of the 
banking sector, also reduce their employment level, when they face serious performance 
declines.    Thus what has occurred is the slow “cleansing” process.     
Second, what current literature insists certainly is on the mark if we limit 
bank-dependent firms to firms whose main bank loan concentrations are high.  The 
higher concentration of bank loans to firms with poor performance give stronger 
incentives to the main bank not to push the necessary restructuring onto the client to 
avoid a serious capital shortage.  Not only that, the high concentration of main bank 
loans may force non-NAD firms to reduce their employment level, through their 
superior position in negotiations.     
In sum, our results imply that the main bank has undergone a role reversal.  
The main bank is expected to help firms avoid inefficient corporate restructuring, and 
by doing so, to keep firm specific skills, while fostering appropriate discipline for firms 
facing serious earnings decline.  However, our results show that the main bank urges 
the firm with relatively better performance to reduce employment more, while it allows 
firms with larger performance declines to delay the necessary restructuring.   
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
After financial deregulation and drastic changes in the macroeconomic situation 
                                                   
15 When we used the fixed effect model, the result is unchanged.   21
since the late 1990s, the financial system in Japan has been getting heterogeneous 
compared to the high growth era when the main bank system dominated.     
Among listed firms in the First Section of TSE, certain numbers of firms with 
high growth opportunities continued to depend on capital markets.  Firms with easy 
access to capital markets in high tech sectors were relatively free from the banking 
crisis in 1997.    Roughly speaking, taking firms with bond ratings A or over, one third of 
all listed firms now depend on capital markets for their financing. They occupied 
approximately 70% of the total firm value, 60% of the total book assets, and over 50% of 
total employees out of all firms on the First Section of the TSE.  For those firms, 
short-term loans are currently supplied by banks based on an explicit contract (credit 
line).  Although bank subsidiaries engaged in the bond related services (Hamao and 
Hoshi 2000) and the credit line was normally supplied by their former main bank, it is 
safe to conclude that main bank became less important to those firms with bond ratings 
of A or higher.    Looking at the corporate governance side, these firms have increasingly 
been under market pressure.  Among these firms, now approximately 20 % of the 
issued shares on average are held by foreign institutional investors, and they are 
actively carrying out corporate board reforms as well as information disclosure (see 
Chapter 10).  Thus, market pressure by institutional investors and bond ratings are 
now playing a major role in corporate governance for those firms. 
On the other hand, however, the rest of firms continued to depend on, or rather 
increased their dependence on bank borrowing in the 1990s.  These firms comprised 
two different categories of firms.  In the first category are firms with low growth 
opportunities for whom main bank is potentially expected to serve a disciplinary role to 
prevent them from over-investment or to encourage corporate restructuring.  In the 
second category are firms that faced high growth opportunities, but found it difficult to 
access capital markets.  For these firms, main bank is supposed to play a facilitating 
role in corporate finance by mitigating asymmetric information. 
Bank troubles in the 1990s heavily affected the role of main bank for both types 
of firms.  Firms with high growth opportunities were basically free from any financial 
constraint.  On the other hand, as long as market response to the events related to   22
banking crisis occurred, the effect of the banking crisis was much more harmful to firms 
in low tech sectors with low profitability and difficulty accessing the capital markets 
than to large firms in high tech sectors with high q and easy access to capital markets.  
In this sense, the banking crisis does not necessary imply the welfare-reducing effect, 
and is supposed to encourage “creative destruction”. 
Under this inexorable process, however, the extent of the “creative destruction” 
(corporate restructuring) highly depends on the debt composition and the main bank 
loan concentration.  While the high bank dependence has encouraged corporate 
restructuring, main bank commitment to client firms played contrasting roles.   
Exploiting their superior position to client firms, the main bank tends to impose 
employment reduction on firms maintaining their earnings.  On the contrary, rolling 
over their loans to client firms, the main bank tends to depress employment reduction 
in firms that needed to reconstruct their businesses.  Thus, what is unique in the 
bank-firm relationship of 1990s Japan is that the main bank relationship imposed a 
hard budget constraint on firms with better performance, while it imposed a soft budget 
constraint on firms with poor performance.         
However, we do not necessarily conclude that relationship banking in Japan is on 
the way out. Given increasing bank dependence even among listed firms, it is highly 
important for banks based on their private information to supply money to firms with 
high growth opportunities but have difficulty accessing capital markets, and to take the 
initiative in corporate restructuring of firms with low growth opportunities.  Since one 
of the reasons for the functional change in the main bank system is the declining 
soundness of the banking sector, it is clear that, as many observers insisted, the 
restructuring of this sector is highly urgent.     
There are some good news on this front.  First, after the banking crisis was partly 
relieved by capital injection from the government, a series of mergers among major 
banks developed and their healthiness has been recovering.  Second, the program of 
financial revitalization is now underway, and non-performing loans are down from  
peak levels.    Third, private equity increasingly plays an important role in the corporate 
restructuring process, complementary to the main bank bail-out mechanism, and   23
bankruptcy procedures are well arranged under the recent regulatory reform.  All 
these reforms may contribute to reconstruct bank health, and monitoring capability, 
which, in turn, will make the threat of termination to client firms credible.   
Thus, the optimistic scenario is that the bank-firm relationship in Japan is now in 
transition toward a healthier and more competitive one that will sustain long-term 
relationships with clients.  Since the increasing commitment of banks to client firms 
could help banks to encourage their corporate restructuring by mitigating free riding 
problems, once the health of banks is restored, and the monitoring capability of the 
banking sector is reconstructed, it would be possible for banks to encourage borrowers’ 
restructuring together with corporate restructuring funds, and to supply new money to 
firms with high growth opportunities.    Of course, nobody knows how long it will take. 
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As a sample, we use the listed companies on the TSE First Section from
1996 to 2000 fiscal year. We use 2-limit Tobit model with dependent
variable restricted within [0,1]. The dependent Variable is the ratio of
bank borrowing to total debt. q is the market-book ratio of the firm,
calculated as the ratio of the market value of the firm(the market value
of stock plus the book value of total debt) divided by the market value of
the assets. DAR is total debt , divided by total asset. Volatility is stock
returns volatility. Size is the log of total asset. Coefficient and t-value is
d
Table 2: Debt choice after the complete deregulationpanel 1: Whole sample
means median means median Std.dev
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means median Std.dev means means means
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Construction, Real Estate, and Retail
loan from main bank /total
asset
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We identify each bank as main bank if it is the largest lender at time t and it is the same as five years ago.
 Firms that is identified as having main bank ties 䵯摥
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Table 4 Internal fund and investment.
The table presents results of fixed-effect regressions for the sample of all listed firms in manufacturing industries in 1st section of TSE.
Firms are defined as firms with high growth opportunities (HQ), if their q is higher than the third quartile of whole sample, while firms
are defined as the one with low growth opportunities (LQ), if q is lower than the first quartile. Independent variables,  I, is investment
level, which is calculated as depreciation plus the difference of fixed assets from period t-1 to period t divided by fixed assets.  q is Tobin’s
q.  CF is cash flow calculated as the depreciation plus after-tax profit minus dividend and bonus paid to directors divided by total asset
SUB is a dummy varibale, which is one if over 15 percent of a firm's issued stock were held by another non-financial institution, and
otherwise zero.  DAR is the sum of bonds and borrowings divided by the market value of the assets. Standard errors, assymptocally
robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses.Panel 1: Industry distribution of firms facing serious earning decline







construction 㤴 㜵 ㄱ⸳㌥ ㄹ 㐮㤷 ㈮㈸
electric equipment ㄱ 㜵 ㄱ⸳㌥ 㐱 ㄰⸷㌥ ㄮ〶
machinery manufacturing 㤲 㜰 ㄰⸵㜥 ㈲ 㔮㜶 ㄮ㠴
chemical manufacturing 㤷 㔰 㜮㔵 㐷 ㄲ⸳〥 〮㘱
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Panel 2: Discrptive statistics
total NAD=1 NAD=0
Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev
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 螙L is the percentage changes of employment, 螙S  is the changes of real sales growth. SUB  is a
dummy varibale, which is one if over 15 percent of a firm's issued stock were held by another non-
financial institution, and otherwise zero.   DAR is bonds and borrowings, divided by the market value
of the assets. LDR is the ratio of borrowings to the sum of borrowing and bond.  MBR is the ratio of
loan from main bank to total asset.腀 NMBR is the ratio of non main bank debt (bank borrowing plus
bond)  to total asset.
Table 5 Summary statistics of employee adjustment
The sample firms are all listed firms in 1st section of TSE except finance and public utilities. Firms are
identified as NAD firms if its three years average of operational profit from 1993-95 were 50% lower
than those of 1988-1990, and otherwise zero.乁䐽〠乁䐽
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Table 6:  Etimation result of employment adustment function in firms
Sample are all listed firms in 1st section of TSE except financial institutions and public utilities. 螙L is the
percentage changes of employment, 螙Lt-1 is the lag of 螙L, 螙S is the changes of real sales growth. SUB is a
dummy varibale, which is one if over 15 percent of a firm's issued stock were held by another non-financial
institution, and otherwise zero.  NAD is dummy variable which is equal one if the three years average of operational
profit from 1993-95 of sample firms were 50% lower than those of 1988-1990, and otherwise zero. DAR is the sum of
bonds and borrowings divided by the market value of the assets. LDR is the ratio of borrowings to the sum of
borrowing and bond. MBR is the ratio of loan from main bank to total asset.腀 NMBR is the ratio of non main bank
debt (bank borrowing plus bond)  to total asse. All regression includes Year dummy. Arellano-Bond dynamic panel
estimation is used. Standard errors, assymptocally robust to heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses.
浡楮⁢慮
汯慮⁶献
慲洧猠汥湧瑨
摥扴
䑩獣楰汩湥⁢礠摥扴 扡湫⁤数敮摥湣
䵡楮⁢慮欠汯慮
捯湣敮瑲慴楯